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Let’s Play: A Walkthrough of Quarter-
Century-Old Copyright Precedent as 
Applied to Modern Video Games 
Kyle Coogan* 
Looking to the copyright protection over the audiovisual 
displays of video games, current precedent—created by extensive 
litigation in the 1980s over early arcade games—may be a round 
hole into which the square peg of today’s highly complex video 
games would have difficulty fitting. This is an issue that has 
increasing importance as the market for the passive consumption 
of video game audiovisual displays through tournament streams, 
walk-throughs, etc., continues to balloon. If courts were to apply 
precedent from litigation in the 1980s to video games as they exist 
today, the idea that copyright protection automatically attaches to 
any and all audiovisual displays generated by a game may not 
hold true. It is uncertain to what extent the reasoning in early 
arcade game litigation regarding the issues of authorship, the 
idea/expression dichotomy, and fixation would yield similar 
holdings. Moreover, it appears similarly uncertain to what extent a 
retreat from earlier precedent may impact publishers’ rights in 
downstream uses of audiovisual displays. Even if potential 
defendants prevailed under either an idea/expression dichotomy 
theory or a fixation theory—meaning the copyright does not attach 
to audiovisuals at the outset—later-fixed audiovisuals may still be 
protectable. The strongest argument potential defendants have, 
therefore, is that their interaction with the game precludes 
copyrightability for the audiovisual displays due to a lack of 
“original authorship” on the part of the publishers. 
                                                                                                             
* J.D., Duke University School of Law, 2017; M.S., Electrical & Computer 
Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2014; B.S., Electrical Engineering, 
Georgia Institute of Technology, 2012. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The application of copyright to software often reflects an 
attempt to “fit the proverbial square peg in a round hole.”1 This 
observation holds true for the subset of software comprised of 
video games. The dual literal and nonliteral copyright protection 
that video games enjoy—for both the computer code and the 
audiovisual displays—invites discussion on two fronts over what 
elements are copyrightable. Looking only to the copyright in the 
audiovisual displays, current precedent—created by extensive 
litigation in the 1980s over early arcade games—may be a round 
hole into which the square peg of today’s highly complex video 
games would have difficulty fitting. This is an issue that has 
increasing importance as the market for the passive consumption 
of video game audiovisual displays2 through tournament streams, 
walk-throughs, etc. continues to balloon—increasing beyond the 
over four billion dollar current market estimate.3 It is uncertain to 
what extent the reasoning in the early arcade game litigation 
regarding the issues of authorship, the idea/expression dichotomy, 
and fixation would yield similar holdings when applied to the 
complexities of present-day games. Moreover, it appears similarly 
uncertain to what extent a retreat from earlier precedent may 
impact publishers’ rights in these downstream uses of the video 
game audiovisual displays. 
                                                                                                             
1 Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 712 (2d Cir. 1992). 
2 Audiovisual displays refer to the combination of sights and sounds as produced by 
the video game software during an instance of gameplay. These displays are increasingly 
consumed as a passive medium. That is, video game fans passively view either live or 
recorded audiovisuals produced by others who are playing the game, much in the same 
way that traditional sports fans passively view sporting events without participation. This 
is distinct from the traditional consumption of the video game medium, which takes place 
interactively, as video game fans play the game themselves, thereby perceiving the 
audiovisuals of their own gameplay in real time. See infra notes 48–50. 
3 See infra text accompanying notes 50–53. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. Legal History 
U.S. copyright law is governed by the 1976 Copyright Act, as 
codified in title 17 of the U.S. Code.4 Section 102(a) defines 
copyrightable subject matter as “original works of authorship” that 
are “fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”5 This definition 
is limited by section 102(b), which delineates the idea/expression 
dichotomy6 by stating that copyright shall not cover “any idea, 
procedure, process, system,” etc.7 That is, copyright extends to the 
original expression of ideas, not the ideas themselves.8 For works 
eligible for copyright under section 102, section 106 outlines the 
rights conferred to an owner of a valid copyright.9 This section 
provides that:  
[T]he owner of [a] copyright . . . has the exclusive 
rights to do and to authorize any of the following: 
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work; . . . (2) to 
prepare derivative works; . . . (3) to distribute 
copies . . . to the public by sale, . . . or by rental, 
[etc.]; . . . (4) to perform the . . . work publicly; . . . 
(5) to display the . . . work publicly; and (6) in the 
case of sound recordings, to perform the . . . work 
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.10 
These rights are subject to some limitations—most notably the 
“fair use” limitations outlined in section 107.11 This section 
provides that “[n]otwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 
106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement 
                                                                                                             
4 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2012). 
5 See id. § 102(a). 
6 This phrase refers to the distinction between copyrightable subject matter—the 
expression created by the author—and uncopyrightable subject matter—the mere 
underlying idea that is being expressed. See infra note 8. 
7 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
8 See id.; see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (“Unlike a patent, a 
copyright gives no exclusive right to the art disclosed; protection is given only to the 
expression of the idea—not the idea itself.”). 
9 See 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. § 107. 
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of copyright.”12 Section 107 further provides four factors that 
“shall” be considered when conducting a fair use analysis: “(1) the 
purpose and character of the use; . . . (2) the nature of the 
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion 
used . . . ; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market 
for or value of the copyrighted work.”13 Therefore, even when a 
valid copyright is found to exist, in certain circumstances uses of 
the copyrighted material may not amount to an infringement of that 
copyright. Ultimately, in looking both at the rights conferred upon 
copyright holders under section 106 of the Copyright Act, as well 
as the ways in which these rights are circumscribed by the fair use 
factors of section 107, the application of copyright law to new and 
changing technologies raises interesting and challenging 
questions—especially in the case of video games. 
Video games have existed since at least the early 1950s, a 
product of early computer science research.14 It was not until their 
introduction into mainstream society a couple of decades later, 
however, that they would spawn extensive litigation over their 
copyrightability. Early cases focused on various aspects of 
copyright law as applied to video games, including: authorship,15 
fixation,16 and the idea/expression dichotomy (i.e., games as 
systems).17 Two general premises were left once the dust on these 
                                                                                                             
12 Id. 
13 Id. For further discussion on the specific elements of qualifying uses, see infra 
Section II.A. 
14 Chris Bateman, Meet Bertie the Brain, the World’s First Arcade Game, Built in 
Toronto, SPACING TORONTO (Aug. 13, 2014), http://spacing.ca/toronto/2014/08/13/meet-
bertie-brain-worlds-first-arcade-game-built-toronto/ [https://perma.cc/NG2D-YFMC]. 
15 Section 102 of the Copyright Act provides that copyrights extend to “original works 
of authorship.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). Therefore, some have attempted to argue that, due to 
the player participation, video games are not sufficiently “original works of authorship,” 
and would thereby not be eligible for copyright protection. See infra Section II.B. 
16 Similarly, section 102 further provides that, to be eligible for copyright protection, 
such an original work of authorship, must be “fixed in a[] tangible medium of 
expression.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). Therefore, other arguments regarding the 
copyrightability of video games have focused on whether or not they are sufficiently 
fixed. See infra Section II.D. 
17 Even where an original work of authorship is found to be sufficiently fixed in a 
tangible medium of expression, in no case shall a copyright protect “any idea, procedure, 
process, or system.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). Rather, a copyright will only extend to the 
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many cases finally settled. First, video games receive two different 
types of copyright protection—both as a literary work for the 
underlying computer code, and as an audiovisual work for the 
audiovisual content generated by this computer code.18 Second, the 
copyright on audiovisuals extends to any and all series of screens 
and sounds capable of being produced by the game.19 
B. Current Downstream Control 
The combination of these two premises—that video games 
receive protection both as literary works in the underlying code, as 
well as audiovisual works extending to any conceivable 
audiovisual output produced by that underlying code—enables 
publishers to exert a large amount of control20 over emerging 
secondary markets21 for video games. This control stems primarily 
from the public performance rights for audiovisual works listed in 
section 106(4),22 which was recently confirmed to encompass 
                                                                                                             
creative expression of such ideas, procedures, processes, or systems. See infra  
Section II.C. 
18 See, e.g., M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 442 (4th Cir. 1986) 
(holding that “a copyright in the audiovisual display, which display is created by a 
computer program, protects not only the audiovisual from copying, but also the 
underlying computer program to the extent the program embodies the game’s 
expression”); Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 856 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding 
that the video game at issue received protection both for the “written work” as well as the 
audiovisual output of the game); see also John M. Neclerio & Matthew C. Mousley, 
Copyright Law Implications in Video Games and Virtual Worlds, in COMPUTER GAMES 
AND VIRTUAL WORLDS: A NEW FRONTIER IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 47, 50 (Ross 
A. Dannenberg et al. eds., 1st ed. 2010). 
19 See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1011 (7th Cir. 1983), cert 
denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983) (construing the phrase “series of related images” in 
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) to “any set of images displayed as some kind of unit”); see also 
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS 5 (2017) 
(“A registration for a computer program covers the copyrightable expression in the 
program code and any copyrightable screen displays it generates,” regardless of whether 
identifying material for the screens is deposited.). 
20 For an in-depth discussion of publisher control on downstream markets, see 
generally Jochen Harttung, The Issue of “Deep Control” in Professional E-Sports – A 
Critical Analysis of Intellectual Property Structures in Electronic Gaming (Nov. 2015) 
(unpublished L.L.M. thesis, University of Toronto) (on file with the University of 
Toronto’s TSpace research repository). 
21 See discussion infra Section I.D. 
22 See, e.g., Red Baron-Franklin Park, Inc. v. Taito Corp., 883 F.2d 275, 279 (4th Cir. 
1989) (“We therefore conclude that the operation of a video game constitutes a 
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many types of internet streaming, regardless of the technology 
employed to deliver the performance.23 This means publishers will 
have control over many of the consumptive uses of their games 
through the internet via streaming, which are distinct from the 
interactive use that is gameplay.24 The extent of this control may 
somewhat contrast with the relatively more limited amount of 
downstream control available to rights holders in areas of gaming 
that take place outside the virtual world—such as board games25 
and athletic performances.26 Whether or not this contrast exists, 
countervailing policy concerns may not necessarily disfavor rights 
holders’ control in these consumptive, downstream uses of the 
audiovisual aspect of video games as they sometimes have in the 
cases of: (1) uses of audiovisual portions of more utilitarian 
                                                                                                             
performance as that term is defined in [17 U.S.C.] § 101.”). As mentioned, the rights 
conferred by section 106 of the Copyright Act include, in the case of audiovisual 
displays, the right “to perform the copyrighted work publicly.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(4); 
see also supra text accompanying notes 9–10. This right is central to the video game 
copyright discussion because, assuming a valid copyright over all of a game’s 
audiovisual displays exists, the playing of the game in front of an audience directly 
violates the public performance rights of the copyright holder. See Red Baron-Franklin 
Park, Inc., 883 F.2d at 279. 
23 See, e.g., Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2506 (2014); see also 
17 U.S.C. § 101. The Transmit Clause defines the exclusive public performance right as 
including the right “to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance . . . to the 
public . . . whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance . . . 
receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or  
at different times.” Id. 
24 See, e.g., About the Nintendo Creators Program, NINTENDO, 
https://r.ncp.nintendo.net/guide/ [https://perma.cc/U9MX-J5KP] (last visited Mar. 3, 
2017) (requiring content creators to be licensed by Nintendo before uploading content 
related to gameplay of Nintendo video games). 
25 See Allen v. Acad. Games League of Am., Inc., 89 F.3d 614, 616 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(holding that tournament play of a copyrighted board game does not constitute a 
“performance” under 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106(4), and noting that the Ninth Circuit “will 
not place such an undue restraint on consumers” by holding otherwise). For further 
discussion, see infra Section II.C. 
26 See, e.g., Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 853 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(allowing Motorola to capitalize on the secondary market for real-time game statistics). 
But see Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 674–75 
(7th Cir. 1986) (holding that player performances fell within copyrightable subject matter 
and were therefore works made for hire, thereby preempting the players’ state law rights 
of publicity claims that might have enabled the players to share in and have some control 
over the telecast rebroadcast rights). 
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software;27 or (2) uses of literary portions (i.e., the code) of video 
game software.28 
C. Genres of Video Games 
Regardless of any policy arguments regarding the control of 
these downstream markets for video games, it is important to 
comprehend the current video game landscape to better understand 
how each genre fits within the broader copyright discussion. Along 
with the rest of semiconductor and computer-related technology, 
video games have progressed quite a long way from the arcade 
games at issue in much of the litigation of the 1980s.29 This has led 
to increased complexity among the wide range of broad video 
game genres that differ in their style of gameplay. The genres that 
will be specifically discussed due to the varying ways in which 
copyright law may apply are: action role-playing games 
(“ARPGs”), massively multiplayer online role-playing games 
                                                                                                             
27 See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 820–22 (1st Cir. 1995) 
(Boudin, J., concurring) (noting that, because Borland copied the menu for the purpose of 
compatibility and avoiding lock-in effects, its use should be permitted), aff’d by an 
equally divided court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996). Lock-in effects refer to the concept that, 
where one becomes accustomed to a certain procedure or idea, if a monopoly were 
granted over that procedure or idea, then the users would be “locked in” to using the 
product produced by whomever had that monopoly. See id. at 821. The example provided 
by Judge Boudin in Lotus is that of the QWERTY keyboard, whereby those who have 
learned to type on the QWERTY scheme would be “captive of anyone who had a 
monopoly on the production of such a keyboard,” despite that the QWERTY scheme is 
really “nothing other than a menu of letters.” Id. at 820–21. 
28 See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1514 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(holding that, “based on the public policies underlying the statute,” reverse engineering to 
create competing games playable on Sega consoles was a fair use, despite it obviating the 
need to pay licensing fees to Sega). For more discussion regarding these policy 
considerations, see infra Part IV. 
29 Compare Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1012 (7th Cir. 1983), 
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983) (“[The player of a video game] cannot create any 
sequence he wants out of the images stored on the game’s circuit boards. The most he can 
do is choose one of the limited number of sequences the game allows him to choose.” 
(emphasis added)), with Rift, OCULUS, https://www.oculus.com/rift/ [https://perma.cc/
23CV-JX5D] (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (describing a virtual reality gaming product that 
allows users to interact fully with their virtual environments). 
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(“MMORPGs”), real-time strategy games (“RTSs”), digital 
collectible card games (“CCGs”), and sandbox games.30 
ARPGs are single-player games that involve a player traversing 
a usually elaborate plot line, existing within a large “open world”31 
universe. However, the crux of the gameplay centers on interacting 
with the environment and various characters along one or a few 
storylines within the game. Examples of ARPGs include The Elder 
Scrolls V: Skyrim32 and Fallout 4,33 both created by Bethesda  
Game Studios. 
MMORPGs are similar to ARPGs in that they both have an 
open universe style. They differ drastically, however, by 
eschewing the more defined plot line, with the gameplay centering 
on an open universe style and the existence of other real-life 
players. The interactions between players in the virtual world are 
elaborate and lead to the creation of virtual economies.34 An 
example includes Blizzard Entertainment’s World of Warcraft.35 
RTSs are another form of gaming, but each virtual world 
consists of a battle arena and usually includes fewer players than 
MMORPGs, typically numbering in the single- or low double-
                                                                                                             
30 Some may take slight issue with the characterizations of these genres in this Article. 
For example, RTSs, as described later in this section, may be interpreted as being more 
accurately labeled by the RTS sub-genre of “multiplayer online battle arena” games 
(“MOBAs”). However, the broader separation of genres set forth (e.g., RTSs/MOBAs as 
distinct from ARPGs) is what is important for this Article. 
31 “Open world” is a term for video games where players can move freely throughout a 
virtual world and are given extensive freedom regarding how and when to approach 
particular objectives, as opposed to other video games that have a more linear structure to 
their gameplay. See, e.g., Jake Muncy, Open-World Games Are Changing the Way We 
Play, WIRED (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/12/open-world-games-2015/ 
[https://perma.cc/4EXA-3PWJ] (“Open-world games leave players to their own devices, 
free to explore what amounts to an enormous sandbox with no boundaries  
and few rules.”). 
32 The Elder Scrolls V: Skyrim, BETHESDA.NET, http://www.elderscrolls.
bethesda.net/skyrim/ [https://perma.cc/GX8N-WVWP] (last visited Mar. 3, 2017). 
33 FALLOUT 4, https://www.fallout4.com/ [https://perma.cc/NL2K-UACG] (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2017). 
34 See generally Edward Castranova, Virtual Worlds: A First-Hand Account of Market 
and Society on the Cyberian Frontier (Ctr. for Econ. Studies & Ifo Inst. for Econ. 
Research, CESifo Working Paper No. 618, 2001). 
35 WORLD OF WARCRAFT, https://worldofwarcraft.com/en-us/ [https://perma.cc/RQC6-
H746] (last visited Mar. 3, 2017). 
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digits. Teams compete to strategically outmaneuver each other and 
destroy the other’s virtual assets. Examples are Blizzard’s Starcraft 
II36 and Riot Games’ League of Legends (“LoL”).37 
Digital CCGs relate to RTSs in that they involve a smaller 
number of players: matches typically involve turn-based play and 
only two players competing against each other. Further, CCGs 
closely mimic the feel of traditional tabletop games with added 
audiovisual components. Examples include Blizzard’s 
Hearthstone38 and Mojang’s Scrolls.39 
Lastly, and in stark contrast to the more confined nature of the 
tabletop, card-game-like feel of digital CCGs, sandbox games are 
games in which users can traverse a large, open universe and 
interact with nearly every aspect of their surroundings. These have 
minimal limitations on what the player’s character can do, 
allowing the player to not only explore the open world, but to 
change it as well.40 One popular example is Majong’s Minecraft,41 
in which players have exceptional latitude to interact with the 
virtual world and build entire worlds out of blocks. 
D. Tournament Play and the Passive Consumption of  
Video Games 
Similar to the progress in video gaming itself—which led to the 
complexities of games in these genres—many developments in 
computing technology have also led to significant changes in the 
way video games are consumed. Most significantly, the pervasive 
nature of the internet and increasingly large bandwidth capabilities 
have led to significant consumption of video games via online 
                                                                                                             
36 Starcraft II, BLIZZARD ENT., http://us.battle.net/sc2/en/ [https://perma.cc/J5XS-
MLU4] (last visited Mar. 3, 2017). 
37 LEAGUE OF LEGENDS, http://na.leagueoflegends.com [https://perma.cc/T269-SGRK] 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2017). 
38 HearthStone, BLIZZARD ENT., http://us.battle.net/hearthstone/en/ [https://perma.cc/
9J93-MTF2] (last visited Mar. 3, 2017). 
39 SCROLLS, https://scrolls.com [https://perma.cc/WZ26-Q7LS] (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2017). 
40 See Sandbox, TECHOPEDIA, https://www.techopedia.com/definition/3952/sandbox-
gaming [https://perma.cc/JCP9-D4J8] (last visited Mar. 3, 2017). 
41 MINECRAFT, https://minecraft.net/ [https://perma.cc/6HFT-6FU5] (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2017). 
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streaming platforms.42 This takes place in the form of “live 
streaming” live gameplay through popular sites such as 
Twitch.tv,43 as well as traditional streaming of user-generated 
content (“video-on-demand”)—such as walk-throughs,44 Let’s 
Plays,45 video game reviews, or other gameplay—all of which are 
typically uploaded to sites such as YouTube.46 Just as early video 
game technologies took passive consumers and turned them into 
interactive consumers,47 these new streaming technologies have 
                                                                                                             
42 See, e.g., Sarah Perez, YouTube Gaming Expands to New Markets, Improves Its 
Browsing and Viewing Experience on Mobile, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 10, 2016), 
http://techcrunch.com/2016/03/10/youtube-gaming-expands-to-new-markets-improves-
its-browsing-and-viewing-experience-on-mobile/ [https://perma.cc/PL6Z-UQ2C]. 
43 See, e.g., ClgDoubleLift, TWITCH, https://www.twitch.tv/clgdoublelift 
[https://perma.cc/PV5J-MRH4] (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (providing a channel for a 
popular streamer for the game League of Legends). 
44 A walkthrough is an instructional video of how to go through a video game, such as 
how to succeed at certain challenging elements, or how to find certain hidden elements 
known as “easter eggs.” See, e.g., RabidRetrospectGames, Destiny 2 Curse of Osiris 
Gameplay Walkthrough Part [One] Full Game (Full Expansion) – No Commentary, 
YOUTUBE (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=88fDyRpvl_Q 
[https://perma.cc/DJ44-Q9MR]; see also Brandon Guerrie, Complete [One-Hundred 
Percent] Guide to a Walkthrough, VENTUREBEAT, (May 3, 2010, 5:14 PM) 
https://venturebeat.com/community/2010/05/03/complete-100-guide-to-a-walkthrough/ 
[https://perma.cc/6YDA-YQGQ]. 
45 A Let’s Play, or an “LP,” is a video of someone playing a videogame with audio 
commentary of the gameplay laid over it, and is edited to focus more on the 
entertainment value of the actual gameplay than it is on instructing. See, e.g., David 
Finniss, What Is a “Let’s Play?,” YAHOO VOICES (Nov. 18, 2009), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20140729024203/http://voices.yahoo.com/what-lets-play-
4901264.html [https://perma.cc/4DEL-AXA4]. 
46 See, e.g., theRedBrad, Fallout 4 Walkthrough Gameplay Part [One] – The 
Apocalypse (PS4), YOUTUBE (Nov. 9, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
r9WsqRhbdF4. While Twitch started as mostly a live streaming platform, and YouTube 
was originally for video-on-demand, both platforms have branched out and offer  
both services. 
47 Greg Lastowska, Copyright Law and Video Games: A Brief History of an Interactive 
Medium, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 495, 498 (Matthew David 
& Debora Halbert eds. 2015) (describing the initial difficulties that the advent of gaming 
brought about due to the fact that, instead of passively consuming media—as one does 
when they read a book or view a movie—gamers interactively consume the media and, in 
doing so, gamers have a part in controlling the game and participating in the experience 
ultimately consumed). 
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ironically shifted some video game consumption back toward a 
more passive medium—i.e., simply viewing streams.48 
Similarly, these new methods of passively consuming video 
games have created new markets by which games can be 
monetized. For one, there can be significant advertising revenue 
for both casual live streams49 and video-on-demand of gameplay or 
walkthroughs. Second, by enabling live streaming of tournament 
play, these technologies have created a growing market for 
professional video game playing, called “e-sports.”50 E-sports is 
seeing explosive growth, reaching nearly $700 million in 
expenditures in 2016, a year-on-year growth of over forty 
percent.51 Combined, the entire streaming market for video 
                                                                                                             
48 See generally Nathan Edge, Evolution of the Gaming Experience: Live Video 
Streaming and the Emergence of a New Web Community, 4 ELON J. UNDERGRADUATE 
RES. COMM. 33 (2013) (discussing the growth of live stream spectatorship  
for video gaming). 
49 Referring to popular players who stream gameplay outside of the context  
of tournaments. 
50 E-sports refers to the organized, competitive playing of video games, often by 
professional gamers. These gamers are professional, insofar as they are either directly 
sponsored by certain entities within the gaming industry, or they have obtained large 
viewerships on certain streaming outlets with advertising, thereby monetizing their 
gaming. With the advent of online streaming services, the popularity of such 
competitions has increased dramatically; albeit, many competitions may also be attended 
in person. See, e.g., Paul Tassi, 2012: The Year of eSports, FORBES (Dec. 20, 2012), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/insertcoin/2012/12/20/2012-the-year-of-esports/#
3e9518837e11 [https://perma.cc/7DGX-VEBB]. 
51  The coming year will see the [e-]sports [e]conomy grow to $696  
million, a year-on-year growth of 41.3%. Brands are expected to 
spend $517 million, broken down into $155 million on advertising, 
$266 million on sponsorship, and a further $95 million on media 
rights. Consumer spending this year on merchandise and tickets will 
amount to $64 million. The remaining $116 million is the total 
investment that game publishers will make into e[-]sports, the share 
that is not directly recouped by any of the other revenue streams. 
NEWZOO, 2017 GLOBAL ESPORTS MARKET REPORT 13 (2017), 
http://resources.newzoo.com/hubfs/Reports/Newzoo_Free_2017_Global_Esports_Market
_Report.pdf?hsCtaTracking=5a96aa39-a810-47a6-834b-559c317775c3%7C6a2d5758-
bab2-4d87-9fbe-f82dc9ba638a&__hstc=133451409.a9903ca3155abdc46b338f58161f
d13f.1490112406280.1490112406280.1490112406280.1&__hssc=133451409.5.1490112
406280&__hsfp=2869597247 [https://perma.cc/B7Y4-L7RM]. 
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games—including both live streaming and video-on-demand—is 
estimated to be over four billion dollars.52 
E. The Potential for Litigation 
Given these figures, there is no doubt that the issue of control 
over these downstream uses of video games is of high importance 
to the various entities involved: the players and teams that compete 
and broadcast their gameplay, the services that facilitate the 
streaming of these broadcasts, and the video game publishers who 
created the games. Further, as the global e-sports market alone 
expected to triple to nearly $1.5 billion by 2020, the stakes are only 
continuing to rise.53 
The industry has already seen quite a bit of litigation around 
various aspects common to other areas of sports, such as player 
contractual disputes and the distribution of broadcasting revenue.54 
It follows that, while most publishers are generally supportive of 
content creation, these disputes might not be far from extending 
                                                                                                             
52 See Market Brief: Gaming Video Content, SUPERDATA: GAMES & INTERACTIVE 
MEDIA INTELLIGENCE, https://www.superdataresearch.com/market-data/gaming-video-
content-2015/ [https://perma.cc/XK37-KWZA] (last visited Mar. 3, 2017); see also James 
Brightman, Twitch Outranks YouTube in $3.8bn Gaming Video Market – Superdata, 
GAMESINDUSTRY.BIZ (July 9, 2015), http://www.gamesindustry.biz/articles/2015-07-09-
twitch-outranks-youtube-in-usd3-8bn-gaming-video-market-superdata [https://perma.cc/
BF9B-GVLV] (showcasing how, even in 2015, gaming video content was “worth about 
$3.8 billion globally, with an audience of 486 million people watching live streams, 
trailers, walkthroughs and all sorts of gaming-related content made by fans”). 
53 NEWZOO, supra note 51, at 14. 
54 See, e.g., Nic Doucet, Report: H2K, TSM to Enter in Legal Dispute Over 
Svenskeren, THESCORE ESPORTS (Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.thescoreesports.com/
news/4753 [https://perma.cc/GUY2-F5MY] (describing a potential suit brought by one e-
sports team against another alleging, inter alia, tortious interference with the fulfillment 
of a popular gamer’s employment contract for the 2016 season). Given the parallels 
between e-sports and more traditional forms of competitive game play that is sports, it 
seems reasonable to predict that many of the same issues that are prevalent in the more 
familiar realm of sports and the law will come to light in the context of e-sports. See 
Andrew Nixon et al., An Overview of eSports Explosion and Legal Issues Arising from It, 
LAWINSPORT (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.lawinsport.com/features/item/an-overview-of-
esports-explosion-and-legal-issues-arising-from-it [https://perma.cc/2AXS-MS8Q]. 
Specifically, the realm of e-sports could see discussion of topics such as: players’ unions, 
salary caps and transparancy, doping (i.e., cognitive enhancing drugs), some form of 
overarching governing or regulatory body to help with dispute resolution and  
rule-setting, etc. Id. 
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into the realm of copyright. In fact, one ordeal involving a popular 
LoL player highlights this rising tension.55 In early 2015, a 
controversy emerged involving a Twitch user who was exploiting a 
feature in LoL that allowed any “solo queue game”56 to be viewed 
through the LoL software by anyone with a LoL account.57 The 
user created a channel called “SpectateFaker,” which automatically 
checked for and streamed any of these solo queue matches 
involving the professional e-sports player, Lee “Faker” Sang-
hyeok.58 Faker, however, had signed a contract with another 
streaming platform, Azubu, to exclusively stream on their 
service.59 In response, Azubu attempted to issue a DMCA 
takedown to Twitch by claiming to be the rights holder, and 
therefore, purporting that they are entitled by the Copyright Act to 
require Twitch to remove the SpectateFaker channel.60 However, 
                                                                                                             
55 See Marc Merrill, SpectateFaker - What We Learned and What We’ll Do, 
http://na.leagueoflegends.com/en/news/riot-games/announcements/spectatefaker-what-
we-learned-and-what-well-do [https://perma.cc/FJ4W-9Q9D] (last visited Mar. 3, 2017). 
The article is attributed to “Tryndamere,” an online handle referring to Marc 
“Tryndamere” Merrill, the Co-Founder and President of Riot Games. Id. 
56 A solo queue game is a type of gameplay, where the user enters into competitive 
team play individually, and the rest of the team members are populated by other random 
individuals. See Solo Queue, URB. DICTIONARY, https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.
php?term=Solo%20queue [https://perma.cc/S45V-LFA3] (last visited Dec. 8, 2017). 
57 Samuel Lingle, SpectateFaker Dares Riot Games to Shut Him Down, DOT ESPORTS 
(Feb. 23, 2015, 2:58 AM), https://dotesports.com/league-of-legends/news/spectatefaker-
riot-games-dmca-dare-1458 [https://perma.cc/Y2NF-HVWN]. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 
2860 (1998), did many things, one of which was to heighten penalties for copyright 
infringement on the internet. See 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2012). At the same time, it also 
created a safe harbor for online service providers (“OSPs”), which are defined in the Act 
as “a provider of online services or network access, or the operator of facilities 
therefore.” Id. § 512(k)(1)(B). However, OSPs must comply with various requirements to 
be eligible for the section 512 safe harbors. See id. § 512(c)(1). One such requirement is 
that, when given proper notice of infringing material being posted on its network, the 
OSP must “respond[] expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is 
claimed to be infringing.” Id. § 512(c)(1)(C). The term ‘proper notice,’ as referred to in 
this subsection, is what is known as a DMCA takedown notice. Further, the Act 
enumerates a few necessary elements for such notice to be effective, including that the 
notice be made by the owner of the allegedly infringed right (i.e., the copyright holder), 
or someone authorized to act on their behalf. See id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i). In this example, 
Twitch would fall within the definition of an OSP, and therefore would seek to comply 
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current precedent dictates that a publisher’s copyright in a video 
game extends to all of the audiovisual displays produced by a 
game, notwithstanding player participation.61 This leads to the 
presumption that Riot Games, the maker of LoL, owns the 
copyright in the stream, and is thereby the only party capable of 
issuing a DMCA takedown request to Twitch.62 This is because not 
only do publishers own the entirety of the audiovisual displays 
produced by their games,63 but the LoL terms of use further 
stipulate that downstream users contract away all control over any 
content produced through playing LoL.64 Therefore, it took Riot 
Games, upon Faker’s request, to issue a separate DMCA takedown 
to successfully shut down the SpectateFaker channel.65 While this 
                                                                                                             
with the section 512 safe harbor requirements to avoid copyright infringement liability. 
According to current precedent, the rights holder over the entirety of the video game 
audiovisuals is the video game publisher, Riot Games. See infra note 62 and 
accompanying text. Therefore, the only person able to issue or authorize the issuance of a 
DMCA takedown to Twitch, the OSP, is the rights holder, Riot Games. 
See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i). 
61 See, e.g., Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 (2d Cir. 1982); see also 
Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1011 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 
464 U.S. 823 (1983) (holding that playing a video game lacked the requisite creativity “to 
make each performance of a video game the work of the player and not  
the game’s inventor”). 
62 See Merrill, supra note 55 (“[T]he DMCA issued by Azubu did not have a legal 
standing as [Riot Games], not Azubu, own the gameplay content.”); see also  
supra note 60. 
63 See Midway Mfg. Co., 704 F.2d at 1011. If players were to assert a theory that 
vested part ownership in the streams with them, they would likely focus on some type of 
implied joint authorship theory or a derivative work theory. The latter would still require 
permission from the publisher, and would only be possible if a copyright in all of a 
game’s audiovisual displays does not in fact attach at the outset, as precedent currently 
mandates. See infra Section III.B for more discussion. Further, the implied joint work 
theory likely lacks the intent necessary to yield a joint work in which the players would 
have rights. See Tyler T. Ochoa, Who Owns an Avatar?: Copyright, Creativity, and 
Virtual Worlds, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 959, 979 (2012); see also Williams Elecs., 
Inc. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 874 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that players are not co-
authors of what appears on screen). 
64 League of Legends Terms of Use, LEAGUE OF LEGENDS, http://na.leagueoflegends
.com/en/legal/termsofuse [https://perma.cc/L482-3LKJ] (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (“We 
(and our licensors) own and reserve all rights and title in and to the Riot Services, and all 
data and content included therein, including . . . Game recordings and broadcasts . . . . 
You can’t create any work of authorship based on the Game Content or Riot Services 
except as expressly permitted by us.”). 
65 See Lingle, supra note 57. 
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anecdote may seem to encompass many legal issues—including 
rights of publicity and harassment66—it is easy to see how these 
tensions surrounding the issue of copyright ownership in the 
underlying streams could spill over into the courts.67 Such a result 
could lead to revisiting the early video game cases of the 1980s, 
thereby affecting the future of gaming.68 This is of particular 
interest because, whereas the earlier cases were concerned with 
competing video games and associated free-rider concerns,69 the 
present climate is about newly arising markets in which content 
creators are building upon the underlying content.70 
II. VIDEO GAMES’ AUDIOVISUAL DISPLAYS REVISITED 
The player contribution associated with interactive media 
particularly implicates issues of fair use when determining the true 
extent of publisher control in these downstream markets. Although, 
                                                                                                             
66 See, e.g., id. 
67 See, e.g., id. (quoting the channel owner saying “I’m doing this stream because I can 
legally and it’s allowed by League of Legends’ legal terms . . . . [This issue is] about a co-
owner of Riot Games being completely out of touch with e[-]sports and the spectator 
mode. It’s about a company (Azubu) issuing a false DMCA claim for content they didn’t 
even own.”). Spectator mode is a feature within LoL that allows users within the LoL 
program to passively view games taking place in real-time without actually participating. 
See Spectator Mode, LEAGUE OF LEGENDS WIKI, http://leagueoflegends.wikia.com/
wiki/Spectator_Mode [https://perma.cc/9PH6-H8N5] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017). By 
streaming a screen capture of this in-game feature on Twitch, the channel owner was able 
to create the SpectateFaker channel. See id. 
68 See, e.g., Lingle, supra note 57 (quoting Marc Merill saying “These are issues that 
will affect the future of the game and the spectator mode [and a]ll of this needs to be 
debated for the future of [LoL] and e[-]sports.”). 
69 See, e.g., Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 619–20 
(7th Cir. 1982), superseded in part by statute, FED. R. CIV. PR. 52(a), as recognized in 
Design Basics, LLC v. Lexington Homes, Inc., 858 F.3d 1093, 1105 (7th Cir. 2017) 
(“Although not ‘virtually identical’ to PAC-MAN, K. C. Munchkin captures the ‘total 
concept and feel’ of and is substantially similar to PAC-MAN.” (citing Midway Mfg. Co. 
v. Dirkschneider, Civ. No. 81-0-243 (D. Neb. July 15, 1981)); Stern Elecs., Inc. v. 
Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 (2d Cir. 1982) (noting that, without copyright protection for 
video games’ audiovisual elements, “a determined competitor” could “manufactur[e] a 
‘knock-off’” video game). 
70 An extreme example of this content creation is “Machinima,” which is a style of 
cinematic production that uses the audiovisual elements of a video game to create 
separate works. See MACHINIMA, https://machinima.com (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) 
(specializing in hosting videos and providing a platform to discuss machinima films). 
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one may also consider authorship and originality, the 
idea/expression dichotomy, and fixation, all of which are discussed 
in this Article later. 
A. Fair Use and EULAs 
As noted above, section 107 of the Copyright Act provides that 
“fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of 
copyright.”71 When “determining whether the use . . . is a fair use,” 
the statute requires that the following four factors be considered: 
“(1) the purpose and character of the use . . .; (2) the nature of the 
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion 
used . . .; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market 
for . . . the copyrighted work.”72 Because the issue of fair use is 
determined via “a case-by-case analysis” in light of the unique 
facts of each case,73 such an analysis may be applied individually 
to the varying uses of differing genres of copyrighted video 
games.74 Fair use is a natural starting point for a discussion on the 
copyrights afforded to video game audiovisuals because, if content 
creators could assert strong fair use arguments for downstream 
uses of video games, it is unlikely that courts would revisit the 
precedent establishing the copyrightability of those games. 
Under such an analysis, the second factor, the nature of the 
work, seems likely to heavily favor game publishers as it pertains 
to the audiovisual portions of their works, because these expressive 
video games are at the core of what copyright intends to protect.75 
The third factor, however—the amount and substantiality—raises 
                                                                                                             
71 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
72 Id. 
73 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994). 
74 Consider: (1) a stream of gameplay with added audiovisuals of the player inlayed on 
the screen, and real-time commentary on the specific strategies employed in an RTS for 
advertising revenue; versus (2) a stream of ARPG gameplay with no commentary or 
review, but done by an unknown player, thereby generating no revenue. One adds much 
more but generates profit, while the other adds virtually nothing but is  
essentially non-commercial. 
75 See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586 (“This factor calls for recognition that some 
works are closer to the core of intended copyright protection than others, with the 
consequence that fair use is more difficult to establish when the former  
works are copied.”). 
398       FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVII:381 
 
an interesting question. If a copyright extends to all of the 
audiovisual displays capable of being generated, then what 
proportion of that work is incorporated by a single play of the 
game? Courts have acknowledged that, notwithstanding the fact 
that “[e]ach time a video game is played, a different sequence of 
images appears on the screen,” the “set of images” capable of 
being displayed receive copyright as an audiovisual work.76 This 
concept suggests that a single instance of gameplay is therefore 
copying the entirety of the copyrighted audiovisual output of the 
game.77 Others might argue, however, that one instance of play is 
really just a small proportion of the game and all of the possible 
permutations of moves. 
The more interesting issues at hand are the interplay between 
the first factor—the purpose and character of the use—and the 
fourth factor—the effect on the potential market for the 
copyrighted work. Under Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., a use deemed commercial under the first factor leads 
to a presumption of market harm in the fourth factor.78 
Importantly, a use that is “significantly transformative,” 
particularly in its benefit to the public, may negate this 
presumption.79 Ultimately, it seems any of the content creators that 
are monetizing through ads, or content distributors, would face the 
shifted burden of Sony.80 
It may be possible for a defendant to rebut this presumption, 
however, given that streaming video is not likely to directly 
replace interactive gameplay. Publishers will likely contest this 
assertion by noting that, to the extent that games are played for 
their plotlines, watching games be played may replace their 
                                                                                                             
76 Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1011 (7th Cir. 1983). 
77 See id. 
78 See 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984) (“If the Betamax were used to make copies for a 
commercial or profit-making purpose, such use would presumptively be unfair.”). 
79 See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(holding that Google’s use of thumbnails to point to infringing websites was a fair use, 
and noting that “a search engine puts images ‘in a different context’ so that they are 
‘transformed into a new creation,’” thereby negating the Sony presumption (quoting Wall 
Data Inc. v. L.A. Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769, 778 (9th Cir. 2006))). 
80 See Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 449. 
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entertainment value.81 Potential defendants could also attempt to 
eliminate this presumption by showing a transformative use.82 It is 
possible that courts may consider the transformation of 
gameplay—originally serving an immersive and interactive 
function—into a consumptive medium—serving a more 
informative function—as a sufficiently transformative fair use, 
thereby favoring the defendants.83 Alternatively, given the 
similarly consumptive and entertaining nature of both uses, courts 
may take the opposite approach and view the new use as 
insufficiently transformative.84 
Nonetheless, a more in-depth analysis of fair use is 
unnecessary because of the Terms of Service agreements (“ToSs”) 
currently distributed with video games. Software users are often 
bound by various covenants and conditions that may limit the ways 
in which they can use the software.85 Failure to abide by these 
stipulations may enable publishers to pursue breach of contract or 
copyright infringement claims, depending on the nature of the 
restriction.86 It is well established that users of software can be 
mere licensees, rather than owners.87 Moreover, parties are free to 
                                                                                                             
81 While this could be an argument for one type of passive consumption, many uses 
involve avid, regular players of a game viewing tournaments, or ARPG players looking 
up instructional walk-throughs to help guide them through the game. 
82 See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1164 (“A work is ‘transformative’ when the 
new work does not ‘merely supersede the objects of the original creation’ but rather ‘adds 
something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new 
expression, meaning, or message.’” (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 
U.S. 569, 579 (1994))). 
83 See id. at 1165 (“Although an image may have been created originally to serve an 
entertainment, aesthetic, or informative function, a search engine transforms the image 
into a pointer directing a user to a source of information.”). 
84 See id. 
85 See MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 939 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(“We refer to contractual terms that limit a license’s scope as ‘conditions,’ the breach of 
which constitute copyright infringement. We refer to all other license terms as 
‘covenants,’ the breach of which is actionable only under contract law.”  
(citation omitted)). 
86 See id. 
87 See, e.g., Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 105 (2011) (“We hold today that a software user is a licensee rather 
than an owner of a copy where the copyright owner (1) specifies that the user is granted a 
license; (2) significantly restricts the user’s ability to transfer the software; and  
(3) imposes notable use restrictions.”). 
400       FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVII:381 
 
contract away their ability to make fair uses of a work via these 
ToSs without being preempted by federal copyright law, even 
where such agreements may be viewed as contracts of adhesion.88 
Currently, many publishers include clauses in their ToSs that 
effectively limit a user’s potentially fair use of the gameplay.89 
Therefore, while fair use would still allow one to avoid a copyright 
infringement suit, publishers would still have remedies under 
contract law.90 Consequently, given the current validity of such 
clauses in relation to federal copyright law, fair use defenses—
even if otherwise viable on their merits—would likely still fail to 
avoid publisher control of these markets. 
B. Authorship and Originality 
In addition to fair use, defendants may resort to other familiar 
arguments to avoid publisher control. One area of debate in early 
case law centered on the interactive element of video game 
consumption—namely, that video game players, through their 
active participation, are partly responsible for the audiovisual 
content ultimately perceived.91 “To qualify for copyright 
protection, a work must be original to the author.”92 Further, 
“[o]riginal . . . means only that the work was independently created 
by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it 
possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.”93 
Consequently, in the early video game disputes, courts had to 
determine to what extent the player’s involvement impacts the 
                                                                                                             
88 See, e.g., Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 639 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting 
that, in a suit brought by Blizzard against a reverse engineer, “a state can permit parties to 
contract away a fair use defense or to agree not to engage in uses of copyrighted material 
that are permitted by the copyright law [sic] if the contract is freely negotiated” (quoting 
Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2003)  
(Dyk, J., dissenting))). 
89 See, e.g., League of Legends Terms of Use, supra note 64. 
90 See MDY Indus., LLC, 629 F.3d at 939 (distinguishing between covenants and 
license conditions, with a violation of the latter giving rise to copyright remedies and the 
former giving rise to contract remedies). 
91 See, e.g., Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 856 (2d Cir. 1982). 
92 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
93 Id. at 345. 
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status of a game’s dynamic audiovisuals as an “original work[] of 
authorship” under the Copyright Act.94 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit did just that 
in Midway Manufacturing v. Artic International, Inc., in which 
they considered “whether the creative effort in playing a video 
game is enough like writing or painting to make each performance 
of a video game the work of the player and not the game’s 
inventor.”95 The game at issue was Pac-Man, and the court 
determined that “[p]laying a video game is more like changing 
channels on a television” than like writing or painting because—
being unable to “create any sequence he wants out of the images 
stored [in] the game[]”—the player lacks “control over the 
sequence of images that appears on the video game screen.”96 
Consequently, the court held that the audiovisual displays were 
eligible for copyright protection as original works of authorship 
despite player interaction.97 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit similarly 
refuted a defendant’s argument in determining whether the player’s 
participation in the game Defender98 “withdraws the game’s 
audiovisual work from copyright eligibility because . . . the player 
becomes a co-author of what appears on the screen.”99 The court 
found the defendant’s argument unconvincing, notwithstanding the 
fact that the player’s participation causes “the audiovisual 
presentation to change in some respects from one game to the 
next,” as “there is always a repetitive sequence of a substantial 
portion of the sights and sounds of the game.”100 Further, “many 
                                                                                                             
94 See, e.g., Stern Elecs., 669 F.2d at 853; Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 
685 F.2d 870, 874 (3d Cir. 1982). 
95 704 F.2d 1009, 1011 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983). 
96 Id. at 1012. 
97 Id. 
98 For more information on the gameplay of this game, see Defender: A [Thirty-Eight]-
Year-Old Arcade Video Game PCB by Williams Electronics., Inc., GAMINGHISTORY, 
https://www.arcade-history.com/?n=defender&page=detail&id=614 
[http://perma.cc/UAD9-T768] (last visited Oct. 14, 2017). 
99 Williams Elecs., Inc., 685 F.2d at 874. 
100 Id. (emphasis added). 
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aspects of the display remain constant from game to game 
regardless of how the player operates the controls.”101 
If courts were to revisit this argument today, it seems possible 
that real-time gameplay would fall short of being a protectable 
audiovisual work. According to precedent, it is possible that courts 
would consider the enhanced ability to interact in modern gaming 
to be a fully “original work of authorship.” On one end of the 
spectrum, some games—namely, digital CCGs—still seem to fit 
squarely within these definitions.102 Conversely, other games—
such as sandbox games or MMORPGs—are much more like 
painting a portrait than they are like “changing channels on a 
television.”103 For example, Minecraft is a game about “staying 
alive in your own fantastic world,” and is “a creative space to build 
almost anything you can imagine!”104 Likewise, World of Warcraft 
is “an online world of . . . limitless adventure.”105 These types of 
open-world games allow a vast array of possibilities for user 
interaction. This makes it nearly impossible to produce an entirely 
similar sequence of audiovisuals from game-to-game, inviting the 
question: To what extent does player contribution change the game 
enough to preclude audiovisual copyrightability as an original 
work of authorship?106 
More vexing are ARPGs and RTSs, as the former has a more 
scripted plotline,107 and the latter has a very confined world with 
“substantially similar gameplay” from game-to-game.108 The way 
                                                                                                             
101 Id. 
102 See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text (describing the traditional, tabletop 
feel of turn-based CCGs). 
103 See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1012 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983). 
104 Tom Stone, How to Minecraft, MINECRAFT (Feb. 23, 2017), https://minecraft.net/en-
us/article/how-minecraft [https://perma.cc/Q3E4-PQ22] (emphasis added). 
105 World of Warcraft Digital Download, BLIZZARD ENT., https://us.battle.net/shop/
en/product/world-of-warcraft [https://perma.cc/ADX5-3YEA] (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) 
(emphasis added). 
106 See Williams Elecs., Inc., 685 F.2d at 874. While these types of games represent the 
most eligible candidates for success under this theory, they are still vulnerable to the 
discussion infra notes 112–18 and accompanying text. 
107 See supra notes 32–33. 
108 See, e.g., League of Legends, What is League of Legends, YOUTUBE (Oct. 13, 2015), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BGtROJeMPeE [https://perma.cc/38ZZ-FSNJ] 
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in which players interact with other characters in ARPGs, through 
the limited sets of responses and the similarity in plotline trajectory 
across plays, lends itself toward analogizing these games to 
“changing channels on a television.”109 Similarly, RTSs like LoL—
with a standard three-lane arena, and a strategy surrounding the 
more predictable way that hazards110 interact with characters—
present a stronger argument that “many aspects of the display 
remain constant . . . regardless of how the player operates  
the controls.”111 
Some may consider these arguments as viewing the more 
broadly expressive elements of the game—such as the plot and 
setting—as constituting the audiovisuals, rather than the more 
discrete “series of related images,”112 that make up the “set of 
images displayed as some kind of unit,”113 which are ultimately 
live streamed or uploaded. Specifically, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit held that the point of inquiry for originality of 
authorship—as it pertains to copyrightability of the audiovisual 
displays—is “the total sequence of images displayed as the game is 
                                                                                                             
(describing the layout of the arena and the recurring way in which various hazards in the 
arena interact with the player character). 
109 See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1012 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983). 
110 The term “hazards” refers to the various aspects of a map that are not controlled by 
any player (i.e., they are controlled by artificial intelligence programmed into the game), 
and that may inflict damage on the players. See, e.g., Summoner’s Rift, LEAGUE OF 
LEGENDS WIKI, http://leagueoflegends.wikia.com/wiki/Summoner%27s_Rift 
[https://perma.cc/2BHY-FFM9] (last visited Oct. 2, 2017) (describing the various 
monsters and turrets positioned throughout a map to inflict damage on each team);  
see also supra note 109. 
111 Williams Elecs., Inc., 685 F.2d at 874. 
[M]any aspects of the sights and the sequence of their appearance 
remain constant during each play of the game. These include the 
appearance (shape, color, and size) of the player’s spaceship, the 
enemy craft, the ground missile bases and fuel depots, and the terrain 
over which (and beneath which) the player’s ship flies, as well as the 
sequence in which the missile bases, fuel depots, and terrain appears. 
Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 856 (2d Cir. 1982). 
112 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
113 Midway Mfg. Co., 704 F.2d at 1011 (suggesting a broader interpretation of the 
phrase “series of related images”). 
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played.”114 Courts may look to the real-time gameplay of an RTS 
such as LoL, and determine that the skill and strategy involved “is 
more like . . . painting a picture,”115 regardless of the more limited 
confines of a LoL arena.116 Certainly, the viewers contributing to 
the nearly half-billion dollar e-sports industry might agree.117 
Ultimately, the protection afforded to live or recorded 
gameplay will likely come down to how courts interpret the 
“substantiality” of similarities between different instances of live 
gameplay118—i.e., does the contribution of the publishers meet the 
standards for copyrightability? Even in games with more freedom, 
players today are still confined to the original creative efforts of, 
for example, Minecraft’s creators. Further, even in games that 
require more skill, such as LoL, players can only interact with the 
arena and the hazards within them in ways conceived by 
developers such as Riot Games. Consequently, some courts may 
construe precedent broadly enough to encompass today’s games. 
Each play of a game exists within the same original world created 
by the publisher. A player’s repertoire of “moves,” while 
exceptionally more complex, may still be akin to changing 
channels, as every user interaction changes the audiovisual display 
only in a way pre-scripted by the programmer-author.119 Thus, 
courts may view the similarities between each instance of 
gameplay as similar enough to warrant protection as original works 
of authorship. 
This potential reasoning hinges on the argument that, 
regardless of how complex video games have become, the 
publishers ultimately author any possible audiovisual sequence, 
                                                                                                             
114 Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878, 883 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Ginsburg, J.) 
(emphasis added) (holding that the single-player game BREAKOUT was sufficiently 
original in its real-time gameplay—as opposed to its constituent elements—to be a 
copyrightable audiovisual work). 
115 Midway Mfg. Co., 704 F.2d at 1012. 
116 The gameplay of RTSs such as LoL focus on a more limited map with a recurring 
way in which various hazards in the arena interact with the player character, such that one 
can use strategy in interacting and traversing with the map as part of their method to 
defeat the other team. See supra note 108. 
117 See generally NEWZOO, supra note 51. 
118 See, e.g., Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 874 (3d Cir. 1982). 
119 See Midway Mfg. Co., 704 F.2d at 1012. 
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notwithstanding any player interaction. This logic rests upon the 
fact that regardless of their complexity, video games still remain—
at their core—elaborate state machines.120 
C. Games as Systems 
This understanding of video games as state machines, on the 
other hand, may also give rise to the argument that video games’ 
audiovisual gameplay is uncopyrightable subject matter.121 It is 
well established that copyright extends only to the expression 
contained in a work, and not to the underlying ideas.122 In 
codifying this concept, the Copyright Act is explicit that a 
copyright over an original work of authorship “[i]n no case” 
extends to any “system” or “method of operation.”123 The 
argument, therefore, is that gameplay, when viewed as a state 
machine or a mere system of rules, falls within the scope of section 
102(b) and thereby represents uncopyrightable subject matter.124 
Importantly, these arguments acknowledge that, just as with board 
games, the underlying expressive elements of video games—such 
as characters, maps, and other creative elements—may be 
copyrightable.125 The real-time combination of these elements is 
what constitutes gameplay, and because their combination takes 
place within a “system”—i.e., the state machine that is a video 
game—any instance of gameplay falls within section 102(b).126 
A key case that seems to support a similar argument is Allen v. 
Academic Games League of America, Inc., in which the U.S. Court 
                                                                                                             
120 See Bruce E. Boyden, Games and Other Uncopyrightable Systems, 18 GEO. MASON 
L. REV. 439, 441–42 (defining a state machine in the context of video games as “a means 
for correlating a range of permitted inputs (i.e., game moves) to a determinate set of 
outputs (i.e., changes in the game state)”). 
121 See generally id. 
122 See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (“Unlike a patent, a copyright 
gives no exclusive right to the art disclosed; protection is given only to the expression of 
the idea—not the idea itself.”). 
123 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original 
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, 
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, 
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”). 
124 See generally Boyden, supra note 120. 
125 See Lastowka, supra note 47, at 504–05. 
126 See id. 
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of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that tournament play of a 
board game did not constitute an infringing public performance.127 
In doing so, the court noted that extending the term “play”128 to 
include “the playing of games” would place an “undue restraint on 
consumers,” as it would allow board game publishers to essentially 
“control when and where purchasers of games may play the 
games.”129 Further, the court noted “[t]his doctrine of merger is 
particularly applicable with respect to games ‘since they consist of 
abstract rules and play ideas.’”130 Ultimately, the court examined 
the statutory definition of “perform”—as used in section 106(4)131 
and originally defined in section 101132—and determined, in a 
somewhat conclusory manner, that “games are meant to be 
‘played.’”133 Consequently, the court held that tournament play of 
a board game did not fall within the meaning of a “public 
performance” as defined by the Copyright Act.134 
                                                                                                             
127 89 F.3d 614, 616 (9th Cir. 1996). 
128 As used in the section 101 definition of “perform” to determine what constitutes a 
“public performance” under section 106(4) of the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C.  
§§ 101, 106(4). 
129 Allen, 89 F.3d at 616. 
The term ‘play’ has not been extended to the playing of games. To do 
so would mean interpreting the Copyright Act in a manner that would 
allow the owner of a copyright in a game to control when and where 
purchasers of games may play the games and this court will not place 
such an undue restraint on consumers. 
Id. 
130 Id. at 617 (quoting Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-Am., Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125, 148 
(D.N.J. 1982)). 
131 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (providing that under the fourth prong of section 106 of the 
Copyright Act, the owner of the copyright over an audiovisual work has the exclusive 
right “to perform the copyrighted work publicly.” (emphasis added)). 
132 Id. § 101 (providing that to “perform” means “to recite, render, play, dance, or act” a 
work (emphasis added)). 
133 See Allen, 89 F.3d at 616. 
134 See id. (“In applying these statutory definitions [of ‘publicly’ and ‘perform’], we 
conclude that the playing of a game is not a ‘performance’ within the meaning of the 
Copyright Act.”). Note, however, that one court explicitly held that merely playing an 
arcade game constitutes a public performance. See Red Baron-Franklin Park, Inc. v. Taito 
Corp., 883 F.2d 275, 279 (4th. Cir. 1989). Nonetheless, that decision has come under 
intense scrutiny. See, e.g., 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.15[I] (2017) (“[T]he Fourth 
Circuit’s reasoning in Red Baron is itself sufficiently deficient that the case’s reasoning 
should be rejected on its own merits.”); Boyden, supra note 120, at 473, n.199. 
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This conclusory holding, however, does not explicitly 
overshadow early debates about the idea-expression dichotomy 
and the issue of merger in the murkier realm of video gameplay. 
One such debate took place in M. Kramer Manufacturing Co., Inc. 
v. Andrews,135 in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit overturned the lower court’s decision that the video game 
at issue “was not copyrightable because it was a ‘system or manner 
of playing a game,’” falling within the exceptions of section 
102(b).136 The Fourth Circuit looked first to the legislative history, 
noting that it reflected an intent for section 102(b) to merely codify 
precedent, and not to “enlarge[] or contract[] the scope of 
copyright protection under the present law.”137 The ultimate intent 
of section 102(b) was to make clear that the expressive elements in 
a computer program—as distinct from the processes or methods—
are copyrightable,138 “whether represented in a video game or 
otherwise.”139 As the Fourth Circuit noted, this holding comported 
with notable earlier cases upholding the copyrightability of 
operating systems, notwithstanding arguments that they were 
uncopyrightable processes or methods of operation.140 
These earlier cases seem to focus more generally on whether 
computer programs were per se uncopyrightable as systems.141 The 
Fourth Circuit then expanded the umbrella of computer programs 
to include video games, noting that the copyright thereby extends 
to the audiovisual elements of a video game, which are an 
extension of the expression of the programmer-author.142 
                                                                                                             
135 783 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1986). 
136 Id. at 434. 
137 Id. Boyden argues this is too narrow of an interpretation, as the precedent construes 
each of the words delineated in section 102(b)—e.g., idea, process, system, etc.—to mean 
“idea” as distinct from “expression,” meaning that all of the examples but “idea” in this 
section are superfluous verbiage. Boyden, supra note 120, at 460. 
138 See M. Kramer Mfg. Co., 783 F.2d at 434. 
139 Id. at 435. 
140 See id. 
141 See id. (“[R]ecent cases . . . have held that computer programs[] are not to be denied 
copyrightability as a ‘process,’ or ‘system,’ precluded from registration under  
section 102(b).” (footnote omitted)). 
142 See id. (noting that “all computer programs [whether in a video game or other 
work] . . . are designed to operate a machine in such a way as to ultimately produce some 
useful communication . . . i.e., to express” (emphasis in original) (quoting Apple 
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Importantly, the court makes little of the distinction between the 
nonliteral and clearly copyrightable elements as they exist 
statically (e.g., characters and maps), versus the dynamic, 
nonliteral elements143 (i.e., the real-time interaction between these 
static elements) that comprise an instance of gameplay.144 The 
court merely noted that the idea of the game is not protected, but 
the “shapes, sizes, colors, sequences, arrangements and sounds 
[that] provide[] something new or additional over the idea are 
protected.”145 Consequently, courts today might be willing delve 
deeper into whether this conclusion necessarily means that an 
instance of real-time gameplay is copyrightable. 
The question, therefore, is to what extent does the application 
of a state machine (i.e., a system) to a set of discrete, static, 
copyrightable elements yield a copyrightable audiovisual output? 
The answer depends on the extent to which courts view the real-
time audiovisual output of the underlying state machine as 
comprising some new or additional expression over the 
uncopyrightable elements of the system.146 For instance, a court 
may apply the Second Circuit’s abstraction-filtration-comparison 
test to determine which aspects of real-time audiovisual gameplay 
are actually protected.147 This test proposes that, in order to 
determine which elements of a computer program are 
copyrightable, one should: (1) “break down the . . . program into 
its constituent structural parts” (i.e., abstraction); (2) examine each 
part for uncopyrightable ideas, “expression that is necessarily 
incidental to those ideas,” or “elements that are taken from the 
public domain” (i.e., filtration); and then (3) compare the 
                                                                                                             
Comput., Inc. v. Formula Int’l, Inc. 775, 780 (C.D. Cal. 1983), aff’d, 725 F.2d 521  
(9th Cir. 1984))). 
143 See MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 942–43 (9th Cir. 
2010) (describing, as it pertains to WoW, the “real-time experience of traveling through 
different worlds, hearing their sounds, viewing their structures, encountering their 
inhabitants and monsters, and encountering other players” as “[the game’s] dynamic non-
literal elements” (emphasis added)). 
144 See M. Kramer Mfg. Co., 783 F.2d at 435. 
145 See id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Atari, Inc. 
v. N. Am. Phillips Consumer Elecs., Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 617 (7th Cir. 1982)). 
146 See, e.g., id. at 435–36. 
147 See, e.g., Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992). 
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expression that remains with “the allegedly infringing program” 
(i.e., comparison).148 Particularly, this inquiry focuses on which 
expressive elements survive the filtration step.149 Specifically, 
courts should look to see if using a system—which merely dictates 
responses to inputs—to produce audiovisual displays comprised of 
these responses is expressive, in sum, when such responses are 
carried out by discrete, expressive elements. For example, consider 
a sand-box game that comprises: an expressive, surreal world; an 
expressive, alien-like character; and the application of impeccably 
realistic, earth-like physics. Looking at each independently, the 
first two are obviously copyrightable, while the latter is not.150 But 
what about the real-time interactions of the first two, as dictated by 
the latter—the earth-like physics? Currently, courts seem reluctant 
to preclude particular expressions in the presentation of even more 
functional151 software from copyrightability.152 Therefore, it seems 
likely that courts will continue to maintain that the audiovisual 
output of a video game system is simply a “particular expression of 
[the] system,” allowing real-time gameplay to continue to qualify 
as copyrightable expression.153 However, this analysis may grow 
more complicated, as even the elements of video games that may 
be perceived as expression—such as maps and environments—are 
increasingly created using elaborate systems of rules to enable 
unfathomably large universes.154 
                                                                                                             
148 See id. 
149 See id. 
150 The underlying portions of the code might be, but in a non-literal sense it is not. 
151 To distinguish from the more recreational software that are video games. 
152 See Am. Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n, 126 F.3d 977, 980 (7th Cir. 
1997) (“A dictionary cannot be called a ‘system’ just because new novels are written 
using words, all of which appear in the dictionary. Nor is word-processing software a 
‘system’ just because it has a command structure for producing paragraphs.”). 
153 See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing 
Toro Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th Cir. 1986)). 
154 See Simon Parkin, No Man’s Sky: The Game Where You Can Explore [Eighteen] 
Quintillion Planets, GUARDIAN (July 12, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2015/jul/12/no-mans-sky-18-quintillion-planets-hello-games 
[https://perma.cc/Z7FR-ZT24] (describing a game featuring “a universe created by 
mathematical rules rather than an artist’s eye and imagination”). It is true this game 
suffered issues at launch associated with claims that the number of planetary variations 
was wildly overstated. See Sam Machkovech, No Man’s Sky Creator Describes Issues 
with Launch, Crashes, Money, ARSTECHNICA (Mar. 2, 2017), https://arstechnica.com/
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D. Fixation 
The question of whether these particular expressions are 
sufficiently fixed still remains.155 Copyright extends only to those 
works “fixed in [a] tangible medium of expression.”156 A common 
argument in the early arcade cases closely tracked the arguments 
involving authorship and originality: contending that the player 
interactivity and the differing sequences of audiovisuals essentially 
demonstrated that there was no “fixed” audiovisual work eligible 
for protection.157 Specifically, the alleged infringers argued that 
because “there is no set or fixed performance” and “the video 
game generates or creates ‘new’ images each time,” the game is 
“transient, and cannot be ‘fixed.’”158 However, courts did not agree 
with this reasoning.159 For example, the Second Circuit noted that, 
while “some of [a video game’s] sights and sounds will not be seen 
and heard during each play of the game[,] . . . the images remain 
fixed, capable of being seen and heard each time.”160 
Consequently, courts generally agreed that a video game 
constitutes an “audiovisual work [that] is permanently embodied in 
                                                                                                             
gaming/2017/03/sean-murray-unveils-hello-labs-will-incubate-more-procedural-tech-
games/ [https://perma.cc/M7AY-NGZR]. Nonetheless, it illustrates the underlying idea 
that games may be increasingly relying on mathematical content-generation systems. 
155 As defined by the Copyright Act: 
A work is “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression when its 
embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of 
the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of 
more than transitory duration. A work consisting of sounds, images, 
or both, that are being transmitted, is “fixed” for purposes of this title 
if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with  
its transmission. 
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
156 Id. § 102(a). 
157 See, e.g., Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 874 (3d Cir. 1982); 
Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855–56 (2d Cir. 1982). 
158 Williams Elecs., Inc., 685 F.2d at 874. 
159 See, e.g., id.; Stern Elecs., Inc., 669 F.2d at 856; Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 
543 F. Supp. 466, 480 (D. Neb. 1981) (“[I]t is clear that the plaintiff’s audiovisual works 
are fixed in the printed circuit boards. The printed circuit boards are tangible objects from 
which the audiovisual works may be perceived for a period of time  
more than transitory.”). 
160 Stern Elecs., Inc., 669 F.2d at 856 (emphasis added). 
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a material object, the memory devices, from which it can be 
perceived with the aid of the other components of the game.”161 
As with the discussions surrounding the authorship argument, 
the courts seemed to focus on the “[t]he repetitive sequence of a 
substantial portion of the sights and sounds” that allowed video 
game audiovisuals to qualify for copyright protection.162 
Therefore, as with authorship, the increased complexity of newer 
video games163 may cause courts to reconsider their previous logic 
that a “substantial” portion of the audiovisuals recur with each 
play, allowing a game to be sufficiently fixed.164 Nevertheless, 
there is a more technical issue unique to fixation that may 
supplement this discussion. Previously, “memory devices,”165 
which enabled the audiovisual displays to be sufficiently fixed, 
were a part of printed circuit boards that were the pervasive 
method of distributing arcade games.166 In early arcade games, the 
game was physically designed into the hardware, and, as the 
technology matured, was later coded into read-only memory 
present on the program boards.167 Today, most video games are 
played on devices with volatile, random-access memory (“RAM”). 
                                                                                                             
161 See, e.g., Williams Elecs., Inc., 685 F.2d at 874 (quoting Stern Elecs., Inc., 669 F.2d 
at 856) (internal quotation marks omitted); Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. at 480 (“The 
printed circuit boards are tangible objects from which the audiovisual works may be 
perceived for a period of time more than transitory. The fact that the audiovisual works 
cannot be viewed without a machine does not mean the works are not fixed.”). 
162 Stern Elecs., Inc., 669 F.2d at 856 (“Nevertheless, many aspects of the sights and the 
sequence of their appearance remain constant during each play of the game.”). 
163 Compare Klaus Scholz, Arcade - Scramble 1981 (HD), YOUTUBE (Oct. 28, 2010), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m-PDf1Su6gA [https://perma.cc/2Q3E-9CZN] 
(showing the specific game at issue in Stern Elecs., Inc., which is an arguably simplistic, 
two-dimensional space shooter), with KingofCasual, World of Warcraft Gameplay 2014 - 
Better Quality | Level 90 Boost, YOUTUBE (Mar. 17, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=_uCG5bkprOc [https://perma.cc/RA9D-THYW] (showing three-dimensional 
gameplay with intricate graphics and greater player interaction in a large,  
open-world format). 
164 See supra discussion in Section II.B. 
165 See Stern Elecs., Inc., 669 F.2d at 856. 
166 See, e.g., ATARI, ASTEROIDS: OPERATION MAINTENANCE AND SERVICE MANUAL 24, 
fig. 16 (1979), https://www.mikesarcade.com/arcade/manuals.html [https://perma.cc/
3TFG-QYP6] (portraying the printed circuit board (PCB) schematic of the video game, 
Asteroids, as it was permanently printed onto the hardware that was distributed inside the 
arcade console). 
167 See id. 
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Moreover, many video games involve extensive use of servers to 
enable multiplayer capability, adding further complexity to the 
question of fixation.168 This latter fact adds a level of complexity 
for a copyright analysis, specifically as it pertains to multiplayer 
games such as RTSs or MMORPGs. 
It is true that, with any game, all of the possible discrete sights 
and sounds are stored in some manner in a fixed form on a disc or 
hard drive. Still, with a MMORPG such as WoW, potential 
defendants may argue that the perceived audiovisual work exists 
merely in RAM and across various servers, as the players’ 
movements and interactions are communicated to a server and vice 
versa. The Ninth Circuit approached the complexity of RAM in 
MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., finding that a 
temporary copy of a program existing in RAM was sufficiently 
fixed to constitute infringement.169 However, this had to do with 
whether a copy in RAM was sufficiently fixed to infringe a work 
that was already fixed and copyrighted—meaning the literal copy 
in RAM was an entire duplicate of the fixed, literal work, and 
would persist ad infinitum until the program was closed.170 Here, 
the question is whether the dynamic, non-literal elements of real-
time video game play are sufficiently fixed to be  
eligible for copyright. 
It is possible that courts may not view new games any 
differently than precedent, noting that, as before, all of the 
potential sights and sounds that form a sequence of images making 
up an audiovisual work are stored within the fixed medium through 
which the game is distributed, and the experience is substantially 
similar from play to play.171 Moreover, in the age of the internet, 
                                                                                                             
168 See, e.g., Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 125, 129–30 
(2d Cir. 2008) (noting how the fact that the technology at issue involves “a complex 
system requiring numerous computers, processes, networks of cables” complicates the 
fixation analysis (quoting Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 
478 F. Supp. 2d 607, 612 (S.D.N.Y. 2007))). 
169 See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Comput., Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(holding that a representation of a computer program “created in the RAM is ‘sufficiently 
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated 
for a period of more than transitory duration’”). 
170 See id. 
171 See, e.g., Stern Elecs., Inc., v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 856 (2d Cir. 1982). 
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courts may still find that all parts of the work are sufficiently 
fixed—whether locally on the gaming device or remotely on 
servers—such that the work in total is eligible for protection.172 
Undoubtedly, today’s games are significantly more complex, 
particularly in light of the fact that much of the interactive 
experience hinges upon the performances of competing players. 
Therefore, “many aspects of the sights [of a game] and the 
sequence of their appearance” may no longer be viewed as 
“remain[ing] constant during each play.”173 Rather, the ever-
changing interactions between the multiple players prevent these 
games from containing such “repetitive sequence[s] of . . . sights 
and sounds.”174 The U.S. Court of Appeals for Second Circuit, in 
Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman, referred to audiovisual displays 
that were “capable of being seen and heard”—specifically, 
portions of the game that you could eventually experience if you 
made it that far into the level.175 Today, there is a virtually limitless 
series of sights and sounds capable of being portrayed, depending 
on the countless interactions with the large quantity of other player 
characters. In light of this, one could argue that the sets of sights 
and sounds ultimately experienced merely exist in a buffer on the 
RAM, and are thereby ineligible for copyright.176 This would mean 
that these massively multiplayer online (“MMO”) games are not 
necessarily fixed at the outset, with the actual gameplay being 
quite fleeting—in stark contrast with gameplay that was fixed in an 
arcade machine’s printed circuit board. 
                                                                                                             
172 See id. at 855 n.4 (“Whether located in the PROM prepared for this particular game 
or elsewhere in the total assembly, all portions of the program, once stored in memory 
devices anywhere in the game, are fixed in a tangible medium within the meaning  
of the Act.”). 
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 See id. at 856 (emphasis added) (“[T]he images remain fixed, capable of being seen 
and heard each time a player succeeds in keeping his spaceship aloft long enough to 
permit the appearances of all the images and sounds of a complete play of the game.”). 
176 See Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 129–30 (2d Cir. 
2008) (declining to extend MAI, and holding that a video stream buffer existed on a 
computer for too transitory of a period to qualify as a directly infringing copy). 
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III. POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES 
A. Copyright Registration 
Notwithstanding this fixation argument, a particular instance of 
gameplay becomes fixed once uploaded or, possibly, transmitted 
via a live stream.177 Similarly, even if the system is treated such 
that copyright cannot attach at the outset to the entirety of the 
audiovisuals capable of being produced, a discrete instance of 
gameplay recorded as a single audiovisual may be eligible for 
copyright protection.178 However, there remains the issue of 
copyright registration for these fixed streams, and the benefits 
conferred to registered works—such as the ability to sue for 
infringement179 or, more significantly, the ability to issue a DMCA 
takedown request.180 Even if the publishers held copyrights in 
audiovisual works deemed fixed by the content creators, 
registering every single stream a publisher wished to monetize or 
take down could incur large transaction costs. Consequently, as a 
practical matter, they would have far less ability to  
control their dissemination. 
                                                                                                             
177 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). Therefore, if publishers began to, in concert with 
hosting the game, permanently store data relating to player movements and gameplay 
(such that the audiovisuals could be reproduced) for a particular instance of play, they 
could argue that they were effectively simultaneously fixing all instances of gameplay. 
Alternatively, they could physically store the audiovisual displays, but this would require 
a lot of storage. 
178 Assuming the player contribution does not amount to authorship, the rights could 
vest in the publisher under the theory that the publisher-author is implicitly authorizing 
the fixation of the gameplay. See id. (providing that a work must be sufficiently fixed “by 
or under the authority of the author” for the fixation to qualify the work for copyright 
eligibility (emphasis added)). 
179 See id. § 411(a) (“[N]o civil action for infringement of the copyright in any [U.S.] 
work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has 
been made in accordance with this title.”). 
180 See, e.g., Schneck v. Orosz, No. 3:13-CV-0294, 2013 WL 5963557, at *10 (M.D. 
Tenn. Nov. 7, 2013) (“Under the circumstances presented, and in the absence of a 
persuasive alternative construction of the DMCA and [section] 411(a), the court finds 
that the DMCA does not displace [section] 411(a)’s registration requirement or the 
registration approach.”). 
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B. Derivative Works 
While fixation is ultimately resolved when the content creator 
uploads a stream, what if publishers failed to maintain 
copyrightability under the other two theories—i.e., authorship or 
idea/expression dichotomy? In that case, publishers would likely 
still seek to continue control of these markets by arguing that these 
streams constitute derivative works.181 In narrowing the 
“overbroad” language of the statute, the Ninth Circuit held that “in 
order to qualify as a derivative work,” a work “must exist in a 
‘concrete or permanent form,’” and “must substantially incorporate 
protected material from the preexisting work.”182 There is 
disagreement over whether this requirement is actually 
necessary,183 but the Ninth Circuit’s analysis is the more stringent 
one, and is therefore, important for publishers to consider when 
looking to maintain control under a derivative work theory. While 
the streams contain none of the literal, copyrighted code 
underlying the game, they are still made up mostly of the discrete 
copyrightable audiovisual elements.184 Because it is likely these 
                                                                                                             
181 According to the Copyright Act: 
A “derivative work” is a work based upon one or more preexisting 
works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, 
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art 
reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a 
work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of 
editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications 
which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a 
“derivative work.” 
17 U.S.C. § 101. Further, under section 106(2), the right to prepare derivative works is 
one of the exclusive rights enjoyed by a copyright holder. See id. § 106(2). Such an 
argument, however, similarly presents the issues addressed in Section III.A regarding 
registration. Nonetheless, if the theory is that the gameplay is a derivative work of the 
underlying, registered code, then there is no registration issue. Alternatively, publishers 
could still selectively register and enforce the copyrights of the derivative works. 
182 Micro Star v. FormGen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Lewis 
Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
183 See, e.g., The Family Movie Act of 2004: Hearing on H.R. 4586 Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 14 (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, U.S. 
Copyright Office) (“I believe that fixation should not be required in order to infringe the 
derivative work right in cases where there is a derivative public performance.”). 
184 See, e.g., jackfrags, BATTLEFIELD 1 ASSAULT GAMEPLAY - Insane Graphics!, 
YOUTUBE (June 13, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X8UB9LVhh6A 
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streams substantially incorporate protected material from the 
preexisting work, the question of permanence of the derivative 
work is the more interesting one. 
Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc. originally 
articulated this question of permanence. The Ninth Circuit found 
that the augmented audiovisual displays arising from a hardware 
kit that sped up a video game system’s gameplay were not 
sufficiently concrete or permanent to qualify as a derivative 
work.185 In contrast, uploaded video streams of gameplay are more 
clearly concrete and permanent. Less clear, however, is how 
concrete and permanent courts would view a live stream.186 
If courts were to look to the fixation element of section 
102(a)187 to determine the permanence of a potentially infringing 
derivative work—as the Ninth Circuit has when applying a fixation 
element to directly infringing copies188—a transmission with 
simultaneous fixation would certainly be concrete and permanent 
enough to qualify as a derivative work, assuming it substantially 
incorporates protected material.189 Without simultaneous fixation 
of the transmission, live streaming may be too “transitory” in 
nature to incorporate the original work in enough of a “concrete or 
permanent” form to qualify as a derivative work if it only exists in 
a series of computer buffers.190 Because public performance and 
derivative works are separate rights within section 106, it is not 
entirely clear if this unfixed public performance derived from the 
original work would be infringing.191 Due to the explicit lack of a 
“fixation” requirement for derivative works, it is likely that courts 
would be unwilling to extend the judicially created “concrete or 
permanent form” requirement so far as to permit unauthorized 
                                                                                                             
(displaying the artfully created map as well as other, discrete, expressive elements that 
comprise an instance of gameplay). 
185 Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 969  
(9th Cir. 1992). 
186 See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
187 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
188 See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Comput., Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993). 
189 See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
190 See Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 129–30  
(2d Cir. 2008). 
191 See 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
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public performances of a work that, while unfixed, substantially 
incorporates protected material.192 Moreover, any argument 
attempting to argue that these derivative works are implicitly 
authorized is easily rendered moot by noting the ToSs often 
explicitly preclude the content creators from having any control 
over uses of the output of the game.193 
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
One driving factor behind the Ninth Circuit’s holding in 
Galoob was that “technology often advances by improvement 
rather than replacement,” noting that the alleged derivative work 
does not supplant demand for the preexisting work.194 Much debate 
in copyright law, as with all areas of intellectual property, centers 
on the competing utilitarian concerns of promoting creativity, 
while at the same time not unduly impinging the ability of others to 
build upon this creativity. Such considerations will likely be at the 
center of any discussions involving the downstream rights of video 
game audiovisual displays. Specifically, policy implications may 
be important because, while there is a concern of under-
incentivizing creativity by precluding publishers’ rights in 
unforeseen or downstream uses of their works, it does not 
necessarily follow that the mere existence of these markets 
automatically allows rights to vest in the publisher.195 
It becomes necessary, therefore, to weigh these competing 
concerns. On one hand, publisher control over these downstream 
uses of video games may not just benefit the game creators, but 
may also have positive externalities for the end-users as well. For 
example, perhaps in part due to the ability for publishers to control 
                                                                                                             
192 See generally Tyler T. Ochoa, Copyright, Derivative Works and Fixation: Is Galoob 
a Mirage, or Does the Form (GEN) of the Alleged Derivative Work Matter?, 20 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 991 (2004) (discussing contradictions inherent in 
the question of whether derivative works must be fixed to be infringing). 
193 See League of Legends Terms of Use, supra note 64. 
194 Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 969  
(9th Cir. 1992). 
195 See Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 246 (1918) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting) (“Property, a creation of law, does not arise from value, although 
exchangeable—a matter of fact.”). 
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their ecosystems and profit from a game after the initial sale, a 
tremendous rise in free-to-play games has emerged.196 Many 
popular games such as Dota 2, LoL, and Hearthstone, are 
distributed free of charge,197 which is probably a utility that would 
not exist if publishers were unable to capitalize on these 
downstream uses. This is likely why publishers and gamers enjoy a 
symbiotic relationship—at least with regards to many of the games 
discussed in this Article. Moreover, with video games and 
uploaded gameplay, there is less concern over lock-in effects than 
there is with the audiovisuals of more utilitarian software—such as 
the user interface of a word processor.198 
Conversely, the primary impetus for copyright law in the first 
place is to promote creativity and progress.199 Overprotection of 
audiovisual displays may run afoul of these utilitarian purposes. 
Further buttressing this concern, there is a related policy argument 
that could be instrumental in shaping the landscape of video game 
streaming. The pervasive use of contracts of adhesion to contract 
away fair use—to the extent that these clauses will not be 
preempted by federal copyright law—could lead to an 
impingement of uses that are fair yet still violate a clause in a 
contract of adhesion.200 Therefore, greater concerns regarding 
preempting the contracting away of fair uses generally, not just in 
the context of video games, may lead to a shift favoring  
content creators. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the recent developments in video game consumption, 
copyright law, as applied to video game audiovisual displays, is 
ripe for revisiting. If courts were to apply precedent from litigation 
in the 1980s to video games as they exist today, the idea that 
                                                                                                             
196 See Eva-Maria Scholz, Business Models for Digital Goods: Video Games (Free-to-
Play Games), IPDIGIT (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.ipdigit.eu/2015/03/business-models-
for-digital-goods-video-games-free-to-play-games/ [https://perma.cc/REQ2-X365]. 
197 See id. 
198 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
199 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
200 See supra Section II.A. 
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copyright protection automatically attaches to any and all 
audiovisual displays generated by a game may not hold true. The 
strongest argument potential defendants have is that their 
interaction with the game precludes copyrightability for the 
audiovisual displays due to a lack of “original authorship” on the 
part of the publishers. Moreover, defendants could also argue that 
games are uncopyrightable systems. However, it is likely that the 
audiovisuals created by publishers constitute enough expression 
beyond the underlying system to defeat this argument. 
Nonetheless, potential defendants would further note that, given 
their complexity today and their dispersed nature in light of the 
internet, video games are not sufficiently fixed to allow for 
copyright. This argument appears similarly ineffective because, 
notwithstanding registration issues, the individual instances of 
gameplay are sufficiently fixed in video-on-demand, and could be 
simultaneously fixed with regard to live streaming.201 
If either of the latter two theories work in favor of potential 
defendants—meaning the copyright does not attach to audiovisuals 
at the outset—then there is additionally the issue of registration for 
those later-fixed audiovisual displays, which is necessary for the 
use of DMCA takedowns. Nonetheless, publishers could still have 
considerable control through a derivative work theory. Ultimately, 
because potential defendants in this case often contract away their 
fair use rights, publishers will likely retain a significant amount of 
control over most types of games under current precedent. The 
authorship/originality argument is the most capable, at the 
moment, of disrupting this status quo. 
                                                                                                             
201 See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
